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A FEDERAL VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY BY REASON
OF INSANITY AND A SUBSEQUENT
COMMITMENT PROCEDURE
By JOSEPH D. TYDINGS*
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
Insanity as a defense to crime has a well-established place in federal
law.1 Some federal courts have been at the forefront of the effort to
reshape the test of criminal responsibility 
-to make modern psychiatric
knowledge relevant to the ancient legal doctrine of mens rea.2 How-
ever, in spite of the availability of the insanity defense, federal criminal
procedure has no special provision for raising this defense and provides,
outside the District of Columbia,3 no verdict that clearly delineates
insanity as the basis for acquittal of criminal charges.
Federal procedure merely requires a criminal defendant to plead
guilty or not guilty.4 He may, after pleading not guilty, raise insanity
as a defense to the charge and present evidence of his mental condition
at the time of the alleged act. If the defendant produces "some evidence"
of insanity, the defense of insanity becomes an issue for the trier of
fact, and the Government must then establish defendant's sanity beyond
a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction. 5 If a guilty verdict
is returned, it is clear that the defense of insanity was rejected. If,
however, a not guilty verdict is returned, no such clarity exists. A not
guilty verdict in a case where the insanity defense is an issue cannot
on its face reflect whether the trier of fact believed the defendant not
guilty (1) because the Government's evidence did not establish beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant did in fact commit the alleged act
or (2) because defendant lacked the mental capacity to commit a crime.
Just as it fails to provide a verdict which clearly demonstrates the
acquittal's rationale in a criminal case involving the insanity defense,
federal criminal procedure also fails to provide any guaranty -that one
who has raised the successful insanity defense will be treated and his
mental condition improved before he is returned to society. There is,
in short, no federal commitment procedure available to restrain one
who interposes a successful insanity defense.' This void in federal
* U.S. Senator from Maryland, B.A., 1951; LL.B., 1953, University of Maryland.
I. Perhaps the earliest reported federal case in which the insanity defense waspresented was United States v. Clarke, 25 Fed. Cas. 454 (No. 14,811) (C.C.D.C. 1818),
where the court instructed the jury that a husband who had shot his wife with a
musket must be acquitted if "the prisoner at the time of committing the act chargedin the indictment was in such a state of mental insanity, not produced by the immediate
effects of intoxicating drink, as not to have conscious moral turpitude of the act." See
also United States v. Schults, 27 Fed. Cas. 1072 (No. 16,286) (C.C.D. Ohio 1854),
where the court adopted the right and wrong test.2. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v.Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 1961).
3. See D.C. CODt ANx. § 24-301 (1961).
4. FtD. R. CRIM. P. 11.5. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486 (1895) ; Fitts v. United States,284 F2d 108 (10th Cir. 1960). See also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797 (1952).6. The Sixth Circuit some years ago indicated that 11 Stat. 157 (1857), 24U.S.C. § 211 (1966), gave all federal courts the authority to commit persons found
not guilty after the introduction of evidence of insanity to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital
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procedure is in contrast to the procedure of most states7 and to the
detailed federal statutory provisions governing other stages of a criminal
case where mental illness may be important. For example, federal law
methodically spells out the means for determining a defendant's men-
tal competence to stand trial and creates the mechanism for committing
incompetents until they are able to assist in the defense of their case.'
Federal law also establishes procedures to regulate the transfer of
federal prisoners to mental institutions in order that they may receive
special treatment.9
The absence of provisions to test mental condition after acquittal
is, of course, tied to the absence in federal practice of a special verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity. A number of bizarre cases have
developed because of the absence of both of these elements of sound
criminal procedure.
One noteworthy example of the problems posed by the void in
federal procedure occurred during my tenure as United States Attor-
ney for the District of Maryland. A young man, having neither a pilot's
license nor a plane but possessed by an unquenchable urge to fly air-
planes, managed with the guidance of a Popular Mechanics manual
to pilot a stolen plane between two states. This was not this young
man's first illegal flight; indeed, he had an irrepressible desire to fly
planes whenever he passed an airport. Fortunately, he always landed
the aircraft without inflicting injury to himself or innocent persons,
but his landings usually inflicted some damage on the aircraft. When
this young man was tried in the district court on the charge of wrong-
ful interstate transportation of the aircraft, he won acquittal after
psychiatric testimony disclosed that the theft occurred while the de-
fendant was acting under an irresistible impulse. Upon the verdict of
not guilty, the young man walked from the courtroom a free man, al-
though the testifying psychiatrists were relatively certain that his pen-
chant for flying would soon lead to another illegal flight in a stolen
aircraft. In fact, the young man was again apprehended after stealing
an aircraft several months later. °
This case clearly exposes the loophole in federal criminal proce-
dure. It is not a solitary example. The possibility of such unregulated
releases does not comport with a rational and well-developed system of
judicial administration, designed to adequately safeguard society and
provide rehabilitation to those who break the public order. The void
in established federal procedure has led to the development of informal
in the District of Columbia. Pollard v. United States, 285 F.2d 81, 82 (6th Cir. 1960) ;
Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450, 464 (6th Cir. 1960). However, this statute
was enacted as "An Act Supplementary to 'An Act to organize an Institution for the
Insane of the Army and Navy, and of the District of Columbia, in said District.'"
Given that scope, it does not appear that the Act was intended to apply to "insane"
civilians residing outside the District of Columbia. The Attorney General of the
United States has so ruled. 17 Ops. Av'r'y G N. 211 (1881).
7. For a discussion of the various procedures used by the several states, see
Figinski, Commitment After Acquittal on Grounds of Insanity, 22 MD. L. Rev. 293,
294-98 (1962).
8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-46 (1951).
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-42 (1951).
10. United States v. Woods, Criminal Nos. 25700 and 26122 (D. Md.).
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practices designed to protect society and provide assistance to the
mentally-disturbed individual.
In absence of federal statutes establishing a commitment proce-
dure, federal prosecutors and judges have taken upon themselves the
responsibility for the individual.' If the United States Attorney be-
comes aware that an accused has a valid insanity defense, 'he often will
attempt to have state authorities assume responsibility for the indi-
vidual and have them institute civil commitment proceedings against
the defendant after acquittal or in lieu of federal prosecution. 12  In
many instances, the state willingly cooperates. However, where rela-
tions between the federal prosecutor and state authorities are not
harmonious, or where the problem individual has no established resi-
dence in the state, the informal approach is inadequate, and the
federal authorities are left without a means of restraining one acquitted
of federal charges because of insanity. In the vast majority of such
cases, the federal prosecutor will not proceed to trial.'"
11. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 626 (2d Cir. 1966) ; United
States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 776 (3d Cir. 1961).
12. Letter From The Honorable William J. Jamison, United States District Judge
for District of Montana, to Senator Joseph D. Tydings, October 12, 1966:
This was brought forcibly to my attention during the past year through a
case in which the defendant was charged with writing a letter threatening the life
of the President of the United States. * * *
The accused at all times maintained that he was competent, although his
court-appointed counsel did not agree with him. His counsel made a motion todismiss the indictment on the basis of the report received from Springfield. This
motion was continued from time to time to give the Department of Justice an
opportunity to express its views. It was quite apparent that if the case proceeded
to trial, a motion to acquit would be granted on the basis of the opinion of the
psychiatrists at Springfield that the defendant was insane when the act was com-
mitted. There was no medical evidence to the contrary.
To complicate matters further, the offense was committed in Montana and
the defendant was a resident of Ohio.
Fortunately a solution was found (after several months' delay) through the
cooperation of the Department of Justice Medical Center and Ohio authorities.
The United States Attorney consented to a dismissal of the indictment on con-
dition that the defendant be returned to Ohio for such disposition as might be
made by the Ohio authorities on any petition for commitment to an institution for
further hospitalization and treatment. An order of dismissal on this condition was
entered, and the accused was committed by Ohio authorities to an institution in
that State.
Had the state authorities of Ohio and Montana refused to proceed pending
the commission of some further overt act, it would no doubt have been necessary
to release a defendant who, in my opinion, was potentially dangerous in the absence
of continued and sustained medication.
13. Letter From The Honorable Ben C. Connally, Chief Judge, United States
District Court for Southern District of Texas, to Senator Joseph D. Tydings, Septem-
ber 16, 1966:
There have . . . been a great many cases where the question of insanity has
been called to the attention of the court by the district attorney or other officials,
resulting in extensive inquiry and examination prior to trial; and in those cases
where there is a real question, the district attorney usually has not desired to
bring the case to trial. The question remains as to where such a person would be
confined if, in fact, he is insane and is dangerous. While the state in many in-
stances has been willing through its procedures to confine such persons, in manyinstances the accused is a transient, or is clearly domiciled in another state. In
those instances the State of Texas frequently has been unwilling to assume the
expense of long confinement for a person who simply happened to have been
arrested and charged with a federal crime during a brief visit to this state. Like-
wise, in some instances those who have committed rather serious crimes, found
to be insane and committed, have been released in short order by the psychiatrists
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The problem arising from the failure of an offender to have an
established residence was spelled out by a United States Attorney from
the mid-west:
[M] any of the persons who are charged with crime in the Federal
Courts . . . have no residence or domicile within any particular
state. There have been instances where we have sought to divert
the mentally incompetent to a state institution. Very often we
cannot find a state that will take them.14
The residence problem' 5 was also the theme of remarks made by
a district judge:
On more than one occasion I have had an accused acquitted
in my court by a general "not guilty" verdict where the sole
defense has been that of insanity and where it has appeared ob-
vious that there should be an investigation made to see whether
the defendant Was presently insane so as to constitute a danger to
himself or the public. While I have wondered whether it has been
my duty to go this far, on occasion I have made informal repre-
sentations to state authorities with the thought that some pro-
ceedings should be initiated to determine the problem under state
law. These representations have been unsuccessful because the
defendants happened to be non-residents and it was thought that
their being committed to a state hospital might be irregular or
impractical.' 6
Many of the cases of the type we are discussing are bizarre to the
point of being hardly believable. An example of a specific case was
provided by a United States Attorney located in one of the Rocky
Mountain States:
[Defendant] was charged with first degree murder on an
Indian reservation for the fatal shooting of an Indian police officer
who had tried to arrest him for driving under the influence of
alcohol. * * * [The Government] obtained an order for mental
examination at the Medical Center for Federal prisoners at Spring-
field, Missouri. The defendant was found competent to stand
trial but insane [at the time of the act] ....
About thirty years ago [defendant] . . . had been convicted
of murder in the State of Oklahoma and received a life sentence.
He had been released from the institution on leave and had not
gone back. Instead he had gone to Wyoming, where he had
actually run for Sheriff, but was not elected.
in the state institutions whose findings are not in accord with those upon which
reliance earlier was had.
14. Letter From F. Russell Millin, United States Attorney, Western District
of Missouri, to Senator Joseph D. Tydings, October 20, 1966.
15. See also Clark v. Settle, 206 F. Supp. 74 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Kitchen v.
Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383, 385 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
16. Letter From The Honorable Thomas J. McBride, United States District
Judge for Eastern District of California, to Senator Joseph D. Tydings, October
6, 1966.
[VOL. XXVII
NOT GUILTY By REASON OF INSANITY
We were able to resolve [this] . . . problem by letting Okla-
homa take him back and then dismissing our charge. However, if
there had been no detainer from Oklahoma, we would have had
no solution and no doubt would have been unsuccessful in the
murder trial.
1 7
A system of federal justice that relies on such fortuitous circum-
stances to protect society and assure that persons suffering from mental
diseases receive adequate care can hardly be worthy of great public
esteem. The federal judicial system cannot continue to rely on fortune
to solve the problems posed by a person being found not guilty of
federal criminal charges after the introduction of insanity evidence. The
gap presently existing in federal criminal procedure must be closed.
A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
There is a need for a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
in federal practice comparable to existing practice in the several states.
When a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is returned, 8 there
should be a determination of the acquitted person's mental condition at
the time of acquittal. Any person whose mental illness has not been
sufficiently arrested to assure society that further dangerous behavior
will not result from the illness should be committed to a mental insti-
tution, both for the protection of society and to assure that the individual
will receive help in his quest for sanity.
In both the Eighty-ninth and Nintieth Congresses, I introduced
legislation to achieve these objectives.' My bill would establish the
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as one possible verdict the
trier of fact could return after the issue of insanity has been raised in
a federal criminal trial. Upon the return of a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity, commitment proceedings against the person so
acquitted could be instituted by either the prosecuting United States
Attorney or the district judge who heard the criminal case. If such
proceedings are brought, a hearing would be held to determine whether
the person, acquitted because of insanity at the time of the alleged act,
is, at the time of the hearing, dangerous either to himself or others be-
cause of his mental condition.
17. Letter From Leroy V. Amen, Assistant United States Attorney, District of
Wyoming, to Senator Joseph D. Tydings, September 19, 1966.
18. When the trier of fact returns a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,
implicit in that verdict will be a finding that the defendant did, in fact, commit an
indictable offense, but has been specially exonerated because of his mental condition.
See McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962); State v. Swink,
229 N.C. 123, 47 S.E.2d 852, 853 (1948) (Ervin, J.). Indeed, in formulating a test of
criminal responsibility the Third Circuit wrote: "The Jury must be satisfied that
at the time of committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law which he is alleged to have violated." United States v. Currens,
290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961). (Emphasis supplied.) See also Dixon, A Legacy
of Hadfield, M'Naghten and McLean, 31 AUSTL. L.J. 255, 260 (1957).
19. S. 1007, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; S. 3753, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
A similar bill was introduced by Senator Kennedy of New York, S. 3689, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966).
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Prior to the commitment hearing, the district court is given the
discretionary power by the bill to commit the person for psychiatric
observation for a period not to exceed sixty days. This pre-hearing
commitment is framed in discretionary rather than mandatory terms
because in most cases where the insanity defense has been raised the
person's mental condition will have been subjected to a good deal of
scrutiny at the trial of the criminal charges. In these cases, the
criminal defendant may have undergone extensive examination and
may even have been subjected to lengthy pretrial commitment either for
examination or to ensure that he was competent to assist his counsel
in the defense of his case and thus competent to stand trial. Reported
cases show as much as thirty-three months treatment between arrest and
trial.2"
The discretionary prehearing commitment will allow psychiatric
observation where the court believes there has not been sufficient
scrutiny of a person's present mental condition prior to and during the
criminal trial. It will also allow the district judge to have the benefit
of a thorough examination of the person's mental condition immediately
before the hearing to determine present dangerousness.
The bill further provides that if, after a hearing at which the
person shall have the assistance of counsel, the court determines that,
because of his insanity, the person would constitute a present danger to
himself or others"' if released from custody, the court shall commit
the person to the custody of the Attorney General who shall hospitalize
him for treatment in a suitable mental institution. Commitment, it
could be argued, should be to the Surgeon General, but remission to the
custody of the Attorney General is patterned after provisions of existing
law. Today, the Attorney General is charged with the custody of per-
sons subjected to pretrial commitment,22 as well as with the custody
of those federal prisoners who suffer mental illness during the term of
their sentences.23 The Attorney General is authorized by the bill to
contract with state and private institutions for the 'hospitalization and
care of persons committed under the bill where federal institutionaliza-
tion may not be desirable.
The bill also insures that a person committed under its provisions
will not be held beyond the ,time when he is a threat to society or to
himself because of mental illness. This is accomplished by preserving
the right of habeas corpus and by requiring the mental institution in
which the person is maintained to make an annual report on the
condition of the person committed to the court that ordered the com-
mitment. These reports will allow the court to observe the progress of
the person and to order his release if it concludes that the danger to
the community or to himself 'has been sufficiently arrested. The annual
20. Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
21. This is the traditional test to determine commitment. See Salinger v. Super-
intendent, 206 Md. 623, 112 A.2d 907 (1955) ; Figinski, supra note 7, at 325. Some
have suggested that the criteria for federal commitment include, additionally, the
notion of dangerousness to federal officers or interests. The difficulties with these
additional criteria, now required in pre-trial commitment, are evident in Royal v.
United States, 274 F.2d 846, 851-53 (10th Cir. 1960).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1951).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 4242 (1951).
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reports will make the committing court aware of the gravity of such
commitment and provide a basis for future consideration of the need
for and value of continued commitment.
The committed person may obtain release from the hospital only
after obtaining a federal2 4 judicial decree predicated upon a certification
of the hospital superintendent that he will not constitute a danger to
himself or others. If the superintendent believes that outright release
is not in the best interests of society or the individual, the person may
be conditionally released by the court under such partial restraints as
are appropriate.2 5 These restraints might include periodic examinations
or day-time release.
The bill attempts to fill the void that now exists in federal criminal
procedure and to strike an appropriate balance -between the interests of
society and the rights of the individual defendant.
POSSIBLE IMPACT ON TEST OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Some federal courts, like many state tribunals, have been slow to
adapt the legal doctrine of criminal responsibility to modern psychiatric
insights. The highly respected former Chief Judge of the Third Circuit,
the Honorable John Biggs, a leader in the movement to bring law and
psychiatry into greater harmony,26 aptly characterized the present lag
in judicial acceptance of psychiatric knowledge when he wrote:
In 1843, when the M'Naghten Rules were promulgated the
foundations of sound forensic psychiatry were being laid. At
M'Naghten's trial a textbook by Dr. Issac Ray was employed which
stated advanced principles for determining the criminal responsi-
bility for the mentally ill. Since the turn of the century great strides
in the advancement of psychiatry have been made. And since the
beginning of World War II the treatment and cure of the men-
tally ill, the insane, has progressed at an astounding pace. But
the criminal law failed utterly to move forward with this achieve-
ment. In this country it has with ... few exceptions ... remained
unchanged. It is as if those who sit cannot read.
24. The need for federal control of the committed person was well stated some
years ago by Professor Dession of Yale Law School:
Where state commitment is both available and reliable, it may well be the
most appropriate way of disposing of a troublesome mental case; but when one
who has committed a federal offense is thus disposed of, the federal government
loses control of the situation. An inmate who is a real hazard may be released in
a relatively short time from some state institutions; for many of these hospitals
are over-crowded, and some are unduly susceptible to local influences. There is,
moreover, the problem . . . of the person without a determinable legal residence.
Suppose the case of another Guiteau, with paranoid designs on the President of
the United States. If such a person were acquitted as insane after one assassina-
tion attempt, should not the federal government be authorized to commit him to an
appropriate federal institution... ?
Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Administration,
53 YALE L.J. 684, 696 (1944).
25. This provision follows the pattern of D.C. CODE ANN. § 24 -301(e). See also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08(3) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
26. See BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND (1955).
27. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 770 (3d Cir. 1961).
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One of the reasons federal jurists have been slow to modify the
standard of criminal responsibility to conform to modern psychiatric
achievements may be the loophole in federal criminal procedure under
discussion. Reported decisions give evidence that the absence of ade-
quate commitment procedures to protect society from the automatic
release of a person acquitted after the interposition of the insanity de-
fense has been a deterrent to a more liberal test of mental responsibility
than the M'Naghten Rule." Indeed, in Sauer v. United States,2 9 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals candidly discussed the problem. In
preserving the M'Naghten Rule as the test of criminal responsibility,
the court forthrightly stated that, if federal civil commitment procedures.
were available to "confine" a person acquitted on insanity grounds, "this
court might be disposed to alter its current views" on the proper in-
sanity test.30
Of course, some federal courts have moved to bring the legal test
of insanity into greater harmony with modern psychiatric advances.
As the circuits adopt more liberal rules relating to the insanity defense,
as in United States v. Currens3l and United States v. Freeman,32 the
need for adequate commitment procedures will become all the more
pressing. Indeed, in the Freeman opinion, Judge Kaufman stated:
Effective procedures for institutionalization and treatment of
the criminally irresponsible are vital as an implementation of to-
day's decision. . . [W]e have not viewed the choice as one
between imprisonment and immediate release. Rather, we be-
lieve the true choice to be between different forms of institutionali-
zation - between the prison and the mental hospital. Under-
lying [our] decision is our belief that treatment of the truly in-
competent in mental institutions would better serve the interests
of society as well as the defendant's. 33
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL
COMMITMENT PROCEDURES
Although there is a need for effective commitment procedures to
handle the individual found not guilty by reason of insanity, some ob-
servers have questioned the authority of the federal government to
create and use such procedures.3 4 Since Congress has not acted to close
the existing loophole in federal criminal procedure, there is a dearth of
controlling judicial decisions on its constitutional authority to do so.
Congress has, however, created a procedure for the commitment of
individuals who are charged with federal crimes but are unable to
28. See Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 428 (10th Cir. 1963).
29. 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957).
30. Id. at 650.
31. 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
32. 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
33. Id. at 626.
34. See Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants,
108 U. PA. L. Riv. 832, 837 (1960). Some have urged that the insanity defense be
abolished altogether, and that the mental condition of the offender be considered only
in designing the offender's rehabilitation. Goldstein and Katz, Abolish the Insanity
Defense - Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 872 (1963).
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assist in their own defense. 5 This procedure has been upheld against
constitutional attack on the ground that the power to commit such
persons was "auxiliary to incontestable national power," i.e., the power
of the United States to prosecute for federal offenses, and as such
"plainly within congressional power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause." 30
Federally-sanctioned pre-trial commitment is an exception to the
traditional approach respecting the care of the mentally ill. This gen-
erally has been viewed as peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the
several states, acting as parens patriae81 One does not challenge the
traditional role of the states in this area by advancing the proposed
legislation discussed above. 8 That proposed, legislation, like the exist-
ing exception covering pre-trial commitment, is designed to leave un-
touched the general responsibility of the states for the treatment of the
mentally ill.3 9
The person subject to commitment under the proposed legislation
is not the typical individual who is subjected to state commitment.
He is not merely suffering from mental illness which makes him dan-
gerous to himself or others. He has committed an act indictable under
federal law and has been prosecuted in a federal court. Furthermore,
the person subject to federal commitment under the proposed legislation
will have avoided a general verdict of guilty by the interposition of a
successful insanity defense. And his acquittal will not have been based
on a general verdict of not guilty which would terminate the federal
power to prosecute and deal with offenders, but rather the acquittal
will result from the special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
If the Congress enacts legislation creating a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity and a subsequent commitment procedure, it would
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-46 (1951).
36. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956).
37. Wells v. Attorney General of the United States, 201 F.2d 556, 559 (10th
Cir. 1953) ; Foote, supra note 34, at 836-37.
38. See legislation creating National Institute of Mental Health, 63 Stat. 380(1949), 42 U.S.C. § 232 (1964), and providing for federal grants to states for, among
other things, "care, treatment and rehabilitation of the mentally ill." 70 Stat. 929(1956), 42 U.S.C. § 242a(a) (2) (1964)..
39. Cf. Wells v. Attorney General of the United States, 201 F.2d 556, 561 (10th
Cir. 1953) (Huxman, J., dissenting):
Whether Congress has constitutional power to-legislate generally in the field
of lunacy and mental incompetency is not an issue in this case and need not behere considered because Congress has not attempted to so legislate. The power
of the state to legislate with respect to lunacy and insanity is an exercise of thepolice power. The asserted right of the federal government to legislate with
respect to mentally incompetent persons is not claimed under any specific grant of
power. It rather arises as the necessary implied power in the exercise of duties
conferred upon various governmental departments by the constitution and con-gressional enactments thereunder. As stated by Judge Ridge in Higgins v.
McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670, 674, "The right of a sovereign to proceed against aninsane person charged with the commission of a felony is incidental to the power
to define crimes and prescribe procedure under a criminal code." . . . Commonprinciples of humanity would seem to dictate that when the federal government
has taken one into lawful custody, under the exercise of valid power, charged
with the responsibility of exhausting its jurisdiction over the subject matter as
well as the person thus brought before it who thereafter is found to be insane, it
then becomes its duty to adequately care and provide for such a one and that this
may be done in an institution set up for that specific purpose.
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not be creating a device unknown to American jurisprudence. The
special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is well recognized in
American jurisdictions. The procedures that such a verdict calls into
play are diverse among the states.4" Nevertheless, the states providing
for such a verdict all accept one central notion - that the person so
acquitted is not immediately discharged from custody. Rather, by one
means or another, society is assured that the person so acquitted is no
longer dangerous because of a mental illness before he is released. And,
in light of the well-known state procedures, it may be argued that the
federal prosecutional power would not terminate at the moment the
special verdict is returned.
The power to prosecute, as well as the sovereign governmental
power of self-protection, 41 creates the authority to punish, and, in
modern context, rehabilitates a person who is found to have transgressed
the laws governing society. The mode of punishment must, of course,
be compatible with the commands of the Constitution, especially the
eighth amendment, but, given that compatibility, it may take a variety
of forms. Congress has given the federal courts special sentencing
procedures applicable to youths42 and juveniles. 43 Legislation has also
provided the means whereby the traditional straight-term sentence
may be avoided, thus affording greater flexibility in the release of
prisoners.4 4 Commitment to a mental institution, after a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity and a finding of present dangerousness,
can be viewed as a specially designed form of rehabilitation which ade-
quately safeguards society while providing treatment for the committed
person. As the Second Circuit has written, the true choice facing the
Government when a person interposes the insanity defense must 'be
between "different forms of institutionalization - between 'the prison
and the mental hospital."
45
The commitment need not be premised upon a finding that the
person is dangerous to federal officers or property since the legitimate
interests of the federal government extend further,46 at least so far as
to require assurance that one, who has been brought into court on
charges of violating federal law and specially acquitted on 'grounds of
insanity, has sufficiently overcome his mental condition to no longer
pose a threat to society. Moreover, it may be argued that the person
involved has already demonstrated his dangerousness to the federal
government by commission of the act that caused the federal prosecu-
tion. To foist such a person upon the states for control and rehabilita-
tion would merely transfer the problem and effectively preclude federal
control over one who has already violated federal laws.
The federal government will not thereby become a general com-
petitor with the states in the care and treatment of the mentally ill.
40. See Figinski, supra note 7, at 294-98.
41. See Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1951).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1951).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a) (1951).
45. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 626 (2d Cir. 1966).
46. Cf. Royal v. United States, 274 F.2d 846, 851-52 (10th Cir. 1960).
[VOL. XXVII
1967] NOT GUILTY By REASON OF INSANITY 141
Rather, it will be assuming control over a particular problem individual
who, by his actions, has brought into play the federal prosecutional
power.4
7
CONCLUSION
The problem of the insane criminal defendant in federal criminal
practice may not be quantitatively great. Nevertheless, the loophole
presently existing in federal procedure represents a serious deficiency.
The informal procedures that have developed to handle the problem are
hardly fool-proof and should be replaced by an effective statutory
formula for dealing with the person who interposes a successful insanity
defense. I intend to work for the enactment of such a procedure.
47. See Dession, supra note 24, at 696, 699,
